Social security pension schemes around the world are facing a number of problems, of which demographic ageing is the most commonly discussed. This paper provides an overview of expected future demographic developments in EU and some other OECD countries, and evaluates some of the range of solutions which have been or are being considered to address this and other problems facing social security in the late 1990s, drawing on examples from OECD countries, from Latin America and from central and eastern Europe. Consideration is given to the possibilities for increasing the level of funding in social security pension schemes or developing funded complementary pension schemes.
DEMOGRAPHIC AGEING

1.1
Social security pension schemes around the world have been coming under increasing pressure as a result of a combination of factors, foremost amongst which is the expected demographic ageing of the population. In many countries the increasing demographic imbalance will be exacerbated by the maturing of the provisions of social security schemes which have been set up, or significantly improved, in the last 20 or 30 years. Social security legislation appears sometimes to have been introduced without adequate consideration being given to the longerterm consequences. The rather rapid ageing of the population which is anticipated in most OECD countries over the next 40 to 50 years results from a combination of factors. Principal amongst these are falling levels of child-bearing and increasing expectations of life. Some other features of particular countries' demographic structure derive from past fluctuations in fertility or migration and the impact of two world wars (for example the post-war baby boom in most OECD countries, and the absence of any prolonged baby boom in Japan where fertility fell sharply from 1950 onwards). The result is a trend towards worsening old-age dependency ratios, i.e. a reducing number of people at the active working ages supporting each person over retirement age. Figure 1 shows the build-up of average achieved family size in the United Kingdom (UK) for cohorts of women born from 1940 to 1978. Average completed family size can be seen to have fallen from 2.4 for women born in 1940 and is now expected to be around 1.8 for women born in the 1970s and later. Another indicator of fertility levels, which is more readily available for comparisons between countries, is the total period fertility rate (TPFR), which is derived as the sum of individual age-specific fertility rates in the year in question. This is not ideal as a proxy for average completed family size, as some of the fluctuations may result purely from changes in the timing of fertility choices. However, the strong downwards trend of TPFRs in most OECD countries over the last 30 or more years is associated not only with a shift towards later child-bearing but also with a corresponding reduction in average completed family size for successive generations of women, as can be readily demonstrated for countries which have the statistics available in suitable form. The movements of TPFRs are illustrated for a selection of OECD countries in Figure 2 .
The increase in expectation of life in the UK, as measured by period mortality rates, is well known to actuaries (Daykin, 1996a) . Figures 3 and 4 show the increases in expectation of life for different OECD countries, illustrating the significant convergence of values which has occurred. Figure 5 presents this information for the UK in terms of cohort survival curves. Of the generation born in 1900, 50% survived to age 67 and only about 6% to age 90. Projected mortality for the 1996-based official national population projections implies that 50% of the generation born in 1980 will survive to age 83 and over 25% to age 90.
As a result of these marked changes in the underlying demographic parameters, the number of older people can be expected to increase steadily in virtually every country, whilst the total population will, at least in the case of OECD countries, not increase so rapidly, and will in many cases soon reach a peak and begin to decline. Many OECD countries can expect to see the population at working ages beginning to decline soon after 2010 (earlier in Japan). This will have a marked effect on the so-called old age dependency ratio. This represents the ratio of the numbers in the population over the normal age of retirement to the numbers in the population at working ages (essentially from the normal school leaver age to normal retirement age). Figure 6 shows the trend in a stylised old-age dependency ratio in a number of OECD countries. This is taken, for ease of calculation and comparison, as the ratio of the numbers in the population aged 65 and over to the numbers aged 15 and over but under 65, regardless of actual retirement ages, school-leaving age, economic activity rates, etc.
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF PENSION PROVISION
2.1
In order to place the UK and Irish pension arrangements in a wider international context, it is worth reflecting briefly on some of the alternative models which have been adopted for pension provision in different countries, either by grand design, or, perhaps more commonly, by a process of evolution. It is customary to describe pension systems in terms of four pillars; the first pillar is social security, the second complementary pension schemes, the third individual saving and the fourth continued earnings in retirement.
2.2
The model which is seen in southern Europe (especially in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) and, until recently in the countries of central and eastern Europe (including Austria) assumes that first pillar social security will take care of most of the needs for income in retirement, and in the event of other contingencies such as death or disability. Social security benefits are earnings-related, up to quite a high earnings ceiling, and usually reflect earnings towards the end of the individual's career. Because of the generally high level of benefits, typically revalued in line with earnings in the economy, private second pillar provision is unnecessary and is consequently not much in evidence, except perhaps for very senior executives. Social security schemes are invariably financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis and there is generally only a very small market in funded private pensions and annuities.
2.3 Some other continental European countries have similar PAYG earnings-related social security schemes but at a less ambitious level. In Germany social security benefits are set at a level which encourages employers to establish occupational pension arrangements, which are typically designed to integrate with the social security benefits to provide an adequate income in total. The occupational pension arrangements, however, are mostly pension promises which employers support through establishing tax-allowable book reserves on their balance sheets. These could be seen as company-based PAYG schemes, or alternatively, and perhaps more accurately, as funded occupational pension schemes with 100% investment in the company itself.
2.4
Because there is an obvious risk to the security of members' pension rights if the employer gets into financial difficulties, German companies operating book reserve pension arrangements pay annual premiums to an insolvency scheme (which they collectively own), which will underwrite vested pension rights if an employer's insolvency leaves them uncovered (incidentally, only those who have been members of a pension arrangement for 10 years or more usually have any vested rights). It appears that there is an increasing trend in Germany to make external investments to back the accounting provisions, although tax and supervisory regulations are not supportive of the trust fund approach adopted in common law countries.
2.5
The French second pillar complementary pension schemes are pay-as-you-go, operated on an industry-wide basis rather than company by company. Security against employers going out of business is therefore provided by solidarity across the industry and, sometimes, when whole industries are in decline, by transfers between industries. Since membership in a complementary scheme is obligatory, and most schemes now operate to one of two common frameworks, the effect is much the same as having a fully public PAYG system, although the institutions which administer it are autonomous non-governmental bodies. In France this is seen as being significantly different from having a national social security system run by a government agency, although the difference may be less obvious to observers from outside France. The complementary schemes are designed as defined contribution schemes, although financed on a PAYG basis and historically probably seen by many people as providing earnings-related benefits.
2.6
Contributions made to the schemes qualify the member for points, which are accumulated and then turned into equivalent pension values at retirement. The real value of the point was intended to be maintained by revaluation in line with earnings growth, but this has not been the case recently. As the contributions are not invested, there is no "market risk", as is commonly associated with defined contributions schemes, although there is a risk that adjustments to the indexation process will produce benefits less than are expected by contributors.
2.7
The revaluation process enables the schemes to continue to balance income and outgo, even in the face of demographic ageing. Another device has been to charge supplementary contributions which do not give entitlement to pension points. Private funded pensions have been very rare in France. Some senior executives receive supplementary company benefits, but these are not generally pre-funded, with a lump sum being paid at retirement only if the executive remains in service until retirement age. A new law 3 on funded pensions was introduced in the last days of the previous government in France but this has not been implemented by the current government and the future for funded complementary schemes remains uncertain 4 .
2.8
Finland has a limited number of earnings-related complementary schemes, with everyone required to join one of them. It is a partially funded system, with PAYG pooling of the indexation of benefits. Although book reserving is not permitted, employers may borrow from their pension funds, which gives rise to a security risk to pension scheme members similar to that which arises with book reserves, and there is, therefore, a compulsory credit insurance requirement to cover the loan-3 La Loi Thomas 4 A wide-ranging review of pension arrangements has recently been initiated.
backs.
2.9
Another model is seen in Denmark, where the main first pillar social security pension is flat-rate (independent of earnings) and non-contributory. Eligibility is based on residence and the system is financed out of general taxation. Those in employment are expected to have a funded private pension. These are negotiated industry by industry and are usually mandatory as part of collective bargaining agreements. Most of them are defined contribution arrangements, financed through specialised pension insurance companies.
2.10
The Netherlands and Ireland also have flat-rate social security benefits, but based on contributions and set at a moderate level to provide a safety net. Funded occupational pension schemes are widespread, mostly on a defined benefits basis.
2.11
The United States is similar except that the first pillar social security scheme is earnings-related, albeit at a relatively modest level of benefits. Canada has both a flat-rate residence-based minimum pension and a contributory earnings-related social security scheme, but it is common for there to be an occupational scheme to top up the level of benefits to a more satisfactory level.
2.12
In the UK the first pillar is the flat-rate basic pension. The second pillar is a mixture of public and private, although compulsory for all employed persons. Everyone with earnings from employment in the relevant band is a member of the State Earnings-Related Scheme (SERPS), unless they are contracted-out of it. Contracting-out may be through a defined benefit or defined contribution occupational pension scheme or through a defined contribution personal pension. Those who are contracted-out receive a contribution rebate on the standard social security contribution, to help finance their funded complementary arrangement. Either occupational or personal pensions are available to provide benefits above the obligatory level.
2.13
Japan has a somewhat similar system to the UK, with contracting-out of the earnings-related social security benefits through defined benefit occupational pension schemes. Defined contribution schemes and, in particular, personal pensions, are not so common in Japan and are not available as a vehicle for contracting-out.
2.14 A further model is seen in Australia, where the basic pension is universal (noncontributory) but means-tested (on both income and wealth). The second pillar is characterised by a mandatory level of contribution to a private funded arrangement, either through an occupational pension scheme or a personal pension. Defined benefit schemes have tended to disappear since the mandatory level of defined contributions was introduced and good progress has been made on developing efficient low-cost delivery of personal pensions.
2.15
Switzerland also has a mandatory requirement to make contributions to a funded second pillar pension, but this is built on top of a contributory basic social security scheme.
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6 2.16 A number of countries have historically operated national schemes based on defined contributions, known as national provident funds. Singapore and Malaysia are among the most successful of these. Everyone in formal employment is required to contribute a fixed percentage of earnings, and the contributions are accumulated, usually by the addition of interest each year (a savings account similar to the UK insurance contracts known as deposit administration), to provide a lump sum at retirement age. Sometimes an annuity facility is also offered. Not all of these provident funds have operated satisfactorily; in some cases high administrative costs have been a problem and returns have failed to keep pace with inflation because of inadequate investment returns. The provident funds in Singapore and Malaysia are based on a single centralised investment fund. However, elsewhere (e.g. in India) the provident funds are operated by employers.
2.17
New provident fund legislation has recently been passed in Hong Kong. Contributions at 5% each for employers and employees are mandatory, but there will be a variety of providers, including employer sponsored schemes, industry wide schemes and open funds. Provident funds can be seen as the forerunners of the mandatory individual account pension systems which were pioneered by Chile in 1981 and which have now become the predominant system in South and Central America. Indeed recent provident funds, like that in Hong Kong, are very similar to these. These developments are described in more detail in section 8.
UNFUNDED LIABILITIES
3.1 Apart from the demographic pressures on social security pension schemes, there are a number of other factors which are driving the need for reform. Some of these are political or philosophical, relating to the role of welfare and the respective role of individual responsibility and community solidarity. Other issues are economic, such as whether pay-as-you-go systems discourage saving.
3.2 A number of commentators have drawn attention to the size of the unfunded liabilities of public pension systems in OECD countries (Roseveare et al (1996) ; Chand and Jaeger (1996); Franco and Munzi (1996) ; Kune (1996); Social Security Committee (1996) ). The existence of unfunded liabilities is inevitably a feature of the predominantly pay-as-you-go method of financing social security schemes. Furthermore, the liabilities relate to a stream of payments far out into the future, against which there is a reasonable expectation of continuing contribution income. The underlying principle is that the pensions for each generation of pensioners can be financed by the contributions of succeeding generations of workers.
3.3
The substantial present value of these accrued liabilities for future benefit payments should only be a cause for concern if a) the scheme is likely to be discontinued, with the contribution income ceasing, b) the present contribution rates would be sufficient but are not sustainable or c) the present contribution rates will not be sufficient and the increases necessary to maintain the system in balance on a pay-as-you-go basis are greater than can realistically be contemplated.
Unfortunately the last of these may well be the case in a number of countries.
3.4 Table 1 shows the present value of unfunded liabilities for a number of countries from Roseveare et al (1996) , expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1994. These particular figures assume future real economic growth at 1½% a year. The original paper also shows figures assuming real growth of 1% a year and 2% a year, but the figures are not as sensitive to this assumption as to the discount rate, the effect of which is shown in Table 1 . Legislation and policies are assumed to remain unchanged, and contributions are assumed held at current levels, which in some cases is not a very realistic scenario.
3.5
These figures have been quoted in support of arguments that the UK should not join European Monetary Union (Social Security Committee, 1996; Stein, 1997) , since, it is alleged, an explicit or implicit consequence of a single currency could be that the UK will end up shouldering a share of other countries' much larger unfunded pension liabilities. However, in our view these figures do not give a clear idea of how difficult it may be to sustain the system in future. The differences reflect different approaches to financing. For example, Denmark appears very high, but this is because the Danish social security is largely taxfinanced, so the whole future liability is registered without the offsetting value of future contributions (or tax). The UK and US are very low, because social security benefits are at a relatively modest level and the contribution schedule (assumed to remain at current levels for the UK and increasing in line with existing legislative provisions for the US) is close to that required to meet the liabilities on a pay-asyou-go basis. Although this appears to be a satisfactory position, in the UK at least the discussion is now about whether the resulting pension levels are too low to make this a sustainable policy.
3.6 Table 2 , which shows figures from Chand and Jaeger (1996) , provides an alternative perspective, highlighting the shortfall in contributions required to meet outgo on a pay-as-you-go basis over the period 1995 to 2050, as compared to 1995 contribution levels. On this basis the UK is clearly particularly well-placed. Some other countries will need to increase contributions by 3% of GDP on average over this period, which certainly represents a significant extra burden.
3.7
A comprehensive analysis of social security cost projections can be found in Franco and Munzi (1996) , based on projections carried out within each country, either as part of a regular programme, such as the Quinquennial Reviews in the UK (Government Actuary, 1995) or on an ad hoc basis in the context of considering the need for pension reform. This wide-ranging study provides some sensitivity analysis, shows the impact of reforms already carried out, and gives pointers to where further reforms are likely to be needed.
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
4.1 In the light of these pressures, changes to pension systems may take a variety of forms, some of which may be politically more difficult to implement than others. In most cases an effective reform will require a number of different elements. One response to increasing costs of pensions on a pay-as-you-go basis could be simply to increase the level of contributions as required. Whilst some increases may be possible, particularly for less mature schemes such as those in Canada and the United States, many schemes are already close to the limit of what seems to be regarded as politically acceptable.
4.2
Contributions from employees and employers could in principle be kept down by increasing, or introducing, government subsidies from general revenue. However, such subsidies would generally require increases in taxation or government borrowing and few countries could contemplate this approach on any major scale for a sustained period.
4.3
The United States and, under recently announced changes, Canada, are charging contributions greater than currently required on a pure pay-as-you-go basis. These will be used to build up a larger fund, which can be drawn down in later years when benefit outgo exceeds contribution income, thus avoiding unacceptably large increases in contributions in the future. This approach raises a number of questions regarding the investment strategy with respect to the accumulating funds. Investing purely in government securities may be felt to create little more than a presentational effect 5 . Allowing a nationally controlled social security scheme to invest substantially in equity markets, on the other hand, raises questions about political control or influence and the funds could grow to an enormous size. For this approach to work, it is probably necessary to split up the fund and devolve the investment decision-making to a number of competing private sector investment managers.
4.4
A variety of approaches have been taken to reducing the cost of benefits. In the end these nearly all come down to reductions in the benefits receivable, the only alternative being to reduce the administrative costs of delivering the benefits. However, the scope for savings in administrative expenses is usually quite limited, since in most schemes they already represent a small part of the total cost.
4.5
Reductions in benefits are likely to be politically controversial, although many countries have discovered ways of doing this which are less overt and consequently inspire less of a popular reaction, although effective, at least over time, in controlling costs. A number of countries have tackled the indexation provisions of pensions in payment, since this can make significant savings over time, but in a relatively unobtrusive way. In OECD countries the change has usually been away from full revaluation in line with movements in gross earnings, to price indexation (as in the UK from 1980 onwards), to indexation in line with movements in earnings net of tax and social security contributions (as in Germany) or dynamism at an average of price and earnings movements (as in Jersey and Hungary).
4.6
Some countries have made explicit reductions in rates of accrual, especially for future service, or increased the requirements to qualify for a full pension (or indeed for a pension at all), such as the reining in of the generous seniority pension provisions in Italy as part of the recent reforms. Tighter controls on the award of disability pensions and lessening incentives to take early retirement may also be considered.
4.7
In the countries of central and eastern Europe, one of the priorities for reform has been to remove the special benefit privileges of certain population groups, so as to provide a uniform scale of benefits to all members. Care can be taken of any perceived need for special treatment in particular fields of employment through tailored occupational arrangements, paid for directly by the employer.
4.8
Many countries have effected, or are planning, increases in retirement age. This reduces the costs of providing pension benefits and, potentially at least, increases contribution income. Full realisation of the beneficial effects on contribution income depends on the extent to which such older individuals remain in employment or self-employment. Some of the changes have been designed to remove inequalities between the sexes. In the UK the retirement age for females will be increased from 60 to 65, starting with those due to retire in 2010, and completing the process in 2020, in order to bring retirement age for females into line with that for males.
4.9
Germany is increasing the minimum age at which pension benefits may be taken, from 63 to 65 for males (over the years 2001 to 2009) and from 60 to 65 for females (over the years 2001 to 2018). Portugal is increasing the retirement age for females from 62 up to 65, the same as that for males, by 2000. Switzerland is increasing the female retirement age from 60 to 62 (male retirement age remains at 65). Italy currently has one of the lowest retirement ages, at 55 for males and 50 for females, but will increase both to 60 by 2001 and thereafter up to 65. In the United States the age at which an unreduced pension is payable is to be increased from 65 to 67 by 2022. Reduced pension will continue to be available from age 62, with the proportionate reduction going up as the pivotal retirement age increases. A proposal has now been brought forward to raise the age for a full pension to 70. Japan is raising retirement age from 60 to 65 by 2014 for males and by 2019 for females.
4.10
In Ireland concern has been more about the inadequacy of provision for certain sectors of the population and recent proposals from the Pensions Board would aim to strengthen the first pillar Social Welfare pension by raising it to 34% of average industrial earnings and then maintaining its real value, at least in line with prices. However, it should be noted that Ireland does not face a demographic ageing problem over the same timescale as most other European countries.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES
5.1
In practice neither contribution increases nor benefit reductions, however packaged, are very attractive politically, although both may be necessary to balance the books. As a result, proposals for reform often include changes of a more fundamental and structural nature.
5.2
A popular idea in recent years has been to move from a defined benefit to a defined contribution structure. This can be an important ingredient in restoring the incentive to contribute in some schemes where contribution compliance levels are poor. Making the ultimate benefit depend directly on the contributions paid should create better incentives, although it does not entirely overcome the problem that the primary concern of most younger people is with immediate take-home pay, rather than on future pension.
The recent Italian reforms, and those proposed in Sweden, adopt a defined contribution model. The individual accounts in which members' contributions are accumulated are notional rather than invested, with revaluation being in line with an index (e.g. related to wages) rather than based on investment returns. In Sweden it is proposed that, in addition, part of the social security contribution (2½% of earnings) should be accumulated in a real fund, with individual accounts. Individuals will choose to invest funds offered by a range of private fund managers authorised by a new supervisory authority.
The January 1997 Advisory Committee on Social Security report in the United States offered several possible suggestions, one of which was similar to this Swedish proposal, and another involved fully private management of the individual accounts. However, it is yet to be seen whether these ideas will lead to changes in the US system.
The difference between an approach involving pay-as-you-go defined contributions, with revaluation in line with GDP (or similar), and a revalued career average salary structure, such as SERPS in the UK, can be a fine one and largely presentational. The accumulated benefits rights in SERPS are derived from accumulating "earnings factors", which are based closely on contributions paid, in line with an index of earnings. This benefit structure may provide a way of increasing the incentive to contribute (through relating the benefit entitlement more closely to what is paid in) but there are problems of financing rigidity in a pay-asyou-go defined contribution scheme, unless significant discretions are left to the scheme managers (as in the French régimes complémentaires -see paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7).
Another advantage of the defined contribution approach to pay-as-you-go social security is that it may be easier to adjust to improving mortality in old age. The Swedish proposals allow the annuity factor at retirement age to be adjusted from time to time in the light of improving expectation of life. This also permits a flexible retirement age, with the annuity corresponding to the age at which the pension is taken. Alternatively, a logical, if rather actuarial, approach might be to raise retirement age regularly -to maintain a constant expectation of life after retirement or a constant ratio of expectation of life after retirement to expected length of working life. However, frequent small changes may present administrative difficulties.
5.7
Some interest is being shown in structuring basic social security schemes more as a safety net than as an income replacement mechanism. This can be done through a flat-rate element, or adopting differential accrual rates which skew the benefit towards the lower paid. The World Bank has argued for a separation of this "social protection" role of a social security scheme from the savings component, which, they argue, is best offered through funded complementary schemes (World Bank, 1994) . Moves to more flexible retirement are also popular, although not of themselves likely to result in lower expenditure on pensions. Indeed in the shorter term they might increase expenditure if people claim their pension earlier, with the possibility of corresponding savings in later years, as the numbers build up with pensions reduced as a result of early retirement.
6. COMPLEMENTARY SCHEMES 6.1 Perhaps the most important element of recent pension reform proposals internationally is the increased role of funded complementary pension arrangements. First and foremost these are seen as creating new savings and investment which will play an important role in the development of the economy and perhaps even enhance the prospects for economic growth. Economists are divided as to whether the expansion of funded complementary schemes will really increase saving, or simply substitute for other savings. Additional monies for investment, moreover, will not automatically generate economic growth unless they can be utilised productively and not simply force up prices in stock markets. Nevertheless, many people believe that there is at least a possibility that increasing the level of funding may assist economic growth, particularly in emerging markets or markets in transition.
6.2 It has increasingly been recognised that the switch from pay-as-you-go to funded provision does not automatically solve the demographic problems. The resources needed to support a growing elderly population will still need to be generated by an economy with a declining number of people at working ages. Wealth can only be transferred to a limited extent over time by investing, although ownership of assets does create a claim on the future resources of the economy. It may well be that such a market mechanism will achieve the transfers of resources necessary to support the elderly more smoothly than direct transfer payments (tax or social security contributions). It is also probable that it will make the process less political. If the additional investment does increase the economic growth, the size of the economic "cake" to be divided up will be greater, and if so the transfer of resources to the elderly will be more affordable and perhaps easier to effect.
6.3
There is a danger that there may be significant disinvestment from share markets in the 2020's and 2030's as increasing numbers of people reach retirement age with access to a funded complementary pension. Although traditional occupational pension funds may need to reduce their exposure to equity markets as their age profile becomes more mature, the problem arises in more acute form with personal pensions, where equity style assets will need to be realised at (or approaching) retirement, with investments then being made in bonds (perhaps particularly indexlinked bonds) as backing for annuities. The costs of longevity will in any case be passed on directly to pensioners through increasing annuity rates.
6.4
There are other reasons why the development of complementary schemes may be seen as desirable. They may help individuals to identify more clearly with their accumulating pension "wealth" and to feel a sense of ownership of the underlying assets. This is seen as assisting in the development of a capital-owning democracy and also in increasing consumer choice. Complementary pension schemes may also offer a greater degree of flexibility to employers and to employees to manage the total remuneration package.
6.5 However, introducing an effective system of complementary pensions is not a straightforward matter. If priority is given to freedom of choice, and compulsion is avoided, then it is difficult to ensure that coverage will not be patchy. Employersponsored schemes are usually more efficient and keep costs down, but they require the active participation of employers. In most countries defined benefit schemes are favoured by members and offer better possibilities for a coherent system of social protection, although there are cases where the pressure for a move to defined contributions has come from employees, and some would argue that defined contribution schemes are more transparent and therefore have advantages from the members' point of view. However, employers seem to be less and less enthusiastic about underwriting the financial risks involved in offering salaryrelated benefits and ensuring that they provide adequate protection against inflation for pensions in payment (and in deferment). To some extent this may be exacerbated by the increasingly onerous regulatory requirements in many countries.
6.6 A system of defined benefit schemes organised by individual employers will normally require considerable numbers of pension actuaries. This may be a significant obstacle in a country where the actuarial profession is in its infancy. Funding for defined benefits may also be quite a difficult exercise in an environment where the investment possibilities are extremely limited and future rates of return are particularly uncertain.
6.7 A further issue with employer-sponsored defined benefit schemes is the question of security of accrued rights. A coherent system needs to ensure that, should the employer go out of business, assets sufficient to pay out the accrued rights, or to purchase equivalent benefits elsewhere, are available. This can be done by: a) investment externally to the employer, with strict limitations on the possibilities for investing the funds in the employer's business (or any related business); or b) investment in the employer's own business (or so-called book reserves, as in Germany) with an adequate system of insolvency to protect against the risk of the employer's insolvency.
Under a) there needs to be an appropriate mechanism for ring-fencing the assets and ensuring that they are not subject to the employer's control (such as the trust concept in common law countries).
6.8 Ideally there should be vehicles available for managing the run-off risk in cases of scheme discontinuance, particularly when the sponsoring employer is no longer involved. This can be organised through the insurance market, albeit at a cost if additional guarantees are involved. Alternatively a rational approach would be to organise a centralised discontinuance fund facility, underwritten by the pensions market as a whole, as exists in various forms in Finland, Japan and the United States of America.
6.9
There are a number of problems to be addressed with a defined benefits system, such as preservation and transferability of rights for early leavers, ensuring that funding levels are adequate, protecting the value of pensions in payment (and in deferment), dealing with deficits and surpluses, etc. This all tends to imply a relatively sophisticated pensions environment, with adequate professional expertise available and a powerful regulatory body.
6.10
There is a trend towards earlier vesting requirements, illustrated by the recent recommendation of the Pensions Board in Ireland to reduce the maximum permitted vesting period from 5 years to 2 years. Whilst helping to reduce perceived unfairness between stayers and early leavers, early vesting requirements add to employer costs and may have the effect of making such schemes less attractive to employers to include as part of the remuneration package.
6.11
For a country taking a first step into the world of complementary pension schemes, a more practical possibility may be to introduce a defined contribution system. This has its own disadvantages, but fits well with the philosophy of individual choice and ownership of wealth. It can be introduced with a relatively simple regulatory structure and it does not place quite such heavy demands on actuaries and other professionals. A significant factor also, in many parts of the world, is that defined contribution individual account complementary pension schemes are strongly recommended by the World Bank, and the World Bank has significant leverage because to its involvement in granting loans to countries with financial problems. However, it leaves much of the risk with the contributing member, in particular risk relating to the real rate of return during the period up to retirement age (including the impact of charges), interest rate risk at retirement age and longevity risk (passed on through annuity rates), not to mention risks of insolvency of providing institutions and risks of being sold the wrong sort of product. The eventual pension is critically dependent on investment performance and, in particular, on the state of the investment markets at the time of retirement. If the investment proceeds are then used to purchase an annuity, the level of pension for the rest of life depends on the annuity terms available at that time, which in turn depends on market yields (fixed interest or index-linked as the case may be).
6.12
It is relevant also to consider the cost and efficiency of different modes of delivery. The current UK contributory social security scheme, covering both basic pensions and additional SERPS pensions (not to mention all the other benefits) incurs administrative costs which were quoted in answer to a recent Parliamentary Question as being at the level of about 1½% of the income. Contributions are collected with taxes and there are huge economies of scale. Even allowing for hidden costs, such as those incurred by employers in operating the system, the overall level of expense is probably no more than about 3 to 4% of the income.
6.13
Occupational pension schemes can also operate relatively cost-effectively, although not quite as cheaply as a social security scheme. The results of a Government Actuary's Department survey have shown that, weighted by size of scheme, average costs amount to about 8% of contribution income. As these figures are on a weighted basis, they strongly reflect the cost structure of larger, and generally more efficient, schemes. The costs represent a higher proportion of income for smaller schemes, coming out at an average of 12% of contribution income on an unweighted basis.
6.14 Charges of 20 to 25% of the contributions would be typical for insured individual account pensions in the UK. These are not all administrative or fund management costs, although administrative costs may be higher for a defined contribution scheme than a defined benefit scheme. Personal pension products are priced to deliver a profit, and a significant part of the cost is accounted for by the need to remunerate salesmen or financial intermediaries, in particular given the need for financial advice in connection with the sale of such products.
6.15
It is worth emphasizing also that a defined contribution scheme addresses the savings aspect of pensions but only deals in a limited way with the protection aspects. It certainly offers no redistribution, which may be seen by some as an advantage, but as a result it does not really serve the same functions as a social security scheme.
6.16
There are many different possible structures for providing defined contribution pensions. In the UK and Ireland the principal vehicles up to now have been insurance products. Provident funds, such as those in Singapore and Malaysia offer another model and competitive funds, as in South America and now central and eastern Europe (see sections 8 and 9) are a further possibility. Compulsory contributions to a particular type of pension arrangement should help to keep costs down, as it removes or reduces the need for advice and, to some extent, marketing.
6.17 A key challenge is to get the administrative costs as low as possible and to make the system as accessible as possible to the whole population. We are already seeing trends for retailers, with no history of providing financial services, moving into the pensions market, so it is not hard to envisage a simple pension product being sold as a commodity in supermarkets or at petrol stations, based on brand awareness rather than a track record in pension provision! In the UK the government is committed to introducing stakeholder pensions as a low-cost vehicle for delivering individual account pensions to parts of the population that existing arrangements have been unable to reach.
6.18
In Ireland there are proposals to introduce a Personal Retirement Savings Account (PRSA) as a new personal pensions vehicle, which may help to reach those parts of the population which occupational schemes do not reach, even with the intended expansion of coverage of occupational schemes to 70% of the working population.
6.19
It is important also not to forget the needs of the self-employed, for whom defined contribution individual savings accounts will normally be the most practical option.
6.20
The tax structure usually plays an important part in facilitating or encouraging different forms of complementary provision. Most countries have chosen to offer some tax reliefs on contributions to approved pension arrangements, usually associated with treating the resulting pensions as taxable. Apart from possible advantages to individuals who move to a lower rate of tax after retirement, this amounts to little more than ensuring that the pension savings are not taxed twice, but it is regarded as psychologically attractive (and avoids the risk, under the alternative system of no tax reliefs and pensions payable free of tax, that future governments may change their mind and tax the pension as well).
6.21 A major concern in countries such as the UK, Ireland and the US has been that the tax régime has become too complicated, with a whole layer of additional regulation designed to prevent misuse of the taxation arrangements, but adding greatly to complexity and sometimes conflicting with other prudential supervision requirements.
7. AVERTING THE OLD-AGE CRISIS 7.1
7.2
In 1994 the World Bank published an influential book on pensions and social security entitled Averting the Old-Age Crisis. Developed by a team of academic economists and World Bank experts, the recommendations contained in the book have been widely promulgated as offering a blueprint for countries seeking to reform their social security pension arrangements.
Following a damning review of the problems which they see afflicting publicly run social security schemes, the World Bank team advocated a solution based on:
---a relatively modest publicly run first pillar, with flat-rate benefits, either on a contributory basis or means-tested and tax-financed; a mandatory second pillar, based on a fully funded defined contribution system, with individual accounts and a competitive market of privately managed funds; a voluntary third pillar of funded occupational and personal pension provision 7.3 The proposal to restrict the first pillar to a modest safety net has not been well received in social security circles internationally, although a number of industrialised countries already organise social security in this way (including UK, Ireland and Netherlands with contributory flat-rate basic pensions, Denmark with a universal flat-rate pension based on residence and Australia with a means-tested pension). The mandatory funded second pillar is also seen as threatening solidarity through the emphasis on individual accounts with no cross-subsidies and little concept of social protection.
7.4 Some reactions, both for and against, are predictable, since the different approaches to social security reflect differing social, political, philosophical and economic points of view. From a technical point of view, the funded, competitively managed, individual account approach to the second pillar can be criticised on grounds of high transaction costs (marketing and administration expenses), the weak level of insurance protection (unless separate insurance elements are introduced) , reinforcing inequalities of income, discrimination against women (and men with breaks in their work histories) and engendering short-termism in investment strategies rather than longer-term investment policies.
7.5
Practical experience of personal pension models, for example in the UK, has led to some disillusionment about the role of financial institutions and intermediaries, the dangers of unprofessional and commission-driven marketing and the risk of disappointing levels of benefit when contribution levels are too low or accumulating funds are eroded by high expense charges or poor real rates of return.
7.6 This is not to say to that there are not valid criticisms of publicly run social security systems. In some countries these systems have been inefficient, they sometimes have perverse incentives which influence labour market behaviour, they often fail to achieve much redistribution, even when that is an explicit objective, and, most tellingly of all, many of them are too costly to the public purse, and becoming more so, even though the transaction costs of delivering pensions by this route may be relatively low. In a few cases this may be because the long-term costs were not adequately recognised when the scheme was established. In others the perception of what was affordable has changed over time, with many governments now pursuing economic policies involving a shift to a lower tax and social cost burden on employment. In many cases it would be possible to address the criticisms, whilst retaining the essential structure of the social security system, rather than making wholesale changes.
7.7
Schemes which resulted in generous benefits to the first generations of pensioners, who had not contributed very much during their working lifetime, have been criticised by some as poor "value for money" for later generations, who will have contributed for a full working lifetime, but may not receive such good benefits because of the changing demographic balance. It can reasonably be argued that such schemes were not designed to deliver good value for money to each individual, or even to each cohort of contributors, but instead offer a system of solidarity to protect the weaker members of society and encourage social cohesion. The extra benefits to the first cohorts were a bonus from the introduction of such a system and cannot be repeated. Such an argument is easier to run if the scheme is explicitly a safety net; there is a respectable line of argument that the safety net should be tax-financed, rather than maintaining a facade of "value for money" by speaking of contributions and entitlements. However, in the UK and Ireland it has generally been felt that there are advantages in maintaining the contributory principle, since the resulting benefits are then more obviously an entitlement, rather than a charity hand-out.
7.8
Alternative mechanisms for the second pillar include employer-sponsored (occupational) defined benefit schemes. These have played a major role in pension provision in the UK and Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, the United States, Canada and Japan, to name but a few. A number of the problems which can affect such schemes have already been mentioned; safeguarding the rights of early leavers, maintaining the value of benefits in inflationary times, ensuring adequate protection for accrued rights, keeping the costs within bounds for employers.
7.9
In a number of countries there is some evidence of a switch of occupational schemes from defined benefit to defined contribution. This is often in response to the perceived open-endedness of the financing commitment by the employer in many defined benefit schemes. However, there is also a feeling that final salary schemes are not well suited to modern employment patterns, where few people will spend a full career with one employer, and more people will spend parts of their career in casual or part-time employment, on fixed term contracts, or in selfemployment.
7.10 A career average revalued structure of defined benefits might have been better able to offer the flexibility required, whilst being less open to some of the abuses which have brought criticisms on final salary schemes, but avoiding some of the features which are open to criticism in defined contribution schemes. However, the current fashion amongst many companies and advisers is to favour a switch to defined contribution (money purchase) schemes. This enthusiasm for money purchase may be tempered if we again experience a period of relatively poor real returns on investment, just as in a previous cycle, money purchase schemes became discredited in the UK in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
SOUTH AMERICAN EXPERIENCES
8.1.
Chile
Chile effected a radical reform of its social security system in 1981, closing down the old defined benefit social security scheme for new entrants and replacing it with a mandatory defined contribution system based on individual accounts. This, in effect, became a funded first and second pillar, although the government guarantees a minimum level of pension for those who have contributed to the funded system for 20 years or more. There are also means-tested welfare benefits (at the very low level of US$50 a month) for those without income from other sources. Those in employment at the time when the new system was introduced were given the choice of opting to remain in the old system. Even now there are 250,000 workers (5% of the economically active population) still contributing to that system, although this is clearly an ageing group. For those who opted to change to the new system, accrued rights to benefit under the old system were recognised through special "recognition bonds" issued by the government, which are a promise to pay a defined amount into the individual account at the time when retirement takes place.
8.1.2
Each member is free to choose to which Administrador de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) to affiliate, there being currently 13 to choose from (down from 24 a few years ago). Contributions are paid at 10% of earnings (up to a ceiling of approximately US$2000 a month at present) into the individual account, the whole amount being payable by the member rather than the employer. A once and for all pay increase was granted to employees to coincide with the introduction of a new scheme. An additional 2 to 3% of earnings is paid to the AFP (the administrator, or manager, of the pension fund) to cover administrative costs, to purchase insurance protection for disability and survivorship benefits, and to generate profit for the AFP.
8.1.3
The AFPs are not entitled to make any annual expense deduction from the funds themselves. Indeed in some circumstances they may have to subsidise the funds, as they are required to guarantee that the return each year will be no lower than 2 percentage points below the average rate of return from all the AFPs. To date there have only been a few occasions on which AFPs have produced returns falling outside this range and have been required to support this guarantee from their own resources.
8.1.4
AFPs may make a charge on exit, if a member transfers his or her monies to another fund, but in practice they do not. Maintaining adequate contribution income is thus the key to their survival and much effort is expended in trying to attract new affiliates. This results in rather high marketing costs and a sum of the order of 15 to 20% of contribution income being absorbed in the expenses of the operation. Although all the charges are made at the front end, no provisions appear to be made for future expenses, so that continued viability depends on having a good number of affiliates.
8.1.5
Affiliates are free to change from one AFP to another. However, if they decide to contribute to a new AFP, they must also transfer their existing balance to the new AFP. An affiliate can only have savings with one AFP at any time. There have been concerns about the frequency of switching. Since the system is compulsory, all employed persons belong to an AFP, so, apart from some scope for increasing coverage among the self-employed, who can opt to contribute, the main way in which an AFP can increase its income (to cover management expenses and create the possibility of profit for the owners) is through persuading affiliates to transfer from another fund. Measures have been introduced to ensure that a transfer is only made as a deliberate choice of the affiliate and not simply under pressure from a sales agent 8.1.6 It is important to distinguish the pension fund itself from the entity which manages the fund. The pension fund is a pure unit fund, without any deduction of charges, and the assets effectively belong to the affiliates. The administrator has to be authorised by the Superintendent of AFPs and must have a minimum level of capital of about US$600,000, There have been three insolvencies of AFPs, that is to say cases where the Superintendent has withdrawn the authorisation to manage a pension fund, on the grounds of insufficient resources in the management company. In these cases the pension fund assets were not impaired, and affiliates were required to transfer the balance of their accounts to new AFPs.
8.1.7
At retirement age the member can opt to convert the accumulated sum into a priceindexed annuity, or to use the draw-down facility (programmed withdrawal), withdrawing an income of his or her choosing, with the option of converting the balance into an annuity later. So far the experience has been of a fairly equal split between those opting for an annuity and those opting for programmed withdrawal. There is evidence, not unsurprisingly, that this results in antiselection from the point of view of the insurance companies, as only the healthier retirees select the annuity option. Annuities have to be indexed (they are expressed in UFsunidades de fomento -a "real" currency unit) but index-linked bonds are available from the central bank so that a reasonable degree of matching of assets to liabilities is possible. The matching possibilities are, however, limited by the range of redemption dates available and by the absence of index-linked bonds with duration of more than about 15 years.
8.1.8
The system has proved successful in many respects, although the success has been due in large part to the spectacular investment returns achieved, averaging 12.5% a year real (in excess of price inflation) over the first 15 years, with 1995 being the only year to produce a negative return. The circumstances giving rise to this were in many ways exceptional. Investment was initially (from 1981 to 1985) restricted to bank deposits and government, mortgage and corporate bonds, but the real returns on these were high. Then interest rates fell and the funds reaped substantial capital gains. From 1985 investment was permitted in the various privatisation issues and this also proved highly profitable for the funds. From 1986 investment was permitted in the shares of joint stock companies, subject to various restrictions, which have been gradually relaxed; these have also yielded good returns. The pension funds had a somewhat bumpy ride in 1997, with significant losses on investments in the privatised electricity company, and set-backs on the Chilean stock exchange in response to global movements in equity markets. However, there was still a positive real rate of return for the year.
8.1.9
The annuity market is growing rapidly, with considerations from accumulated AFP monies at retirement age now constituting 80% of premium income of the insurance market. Although the insurance market generally is relatively lightly regulated, with companies having freedom to develop new products and to set premium rates, annuity reserves are controlled by the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS). A new mortality table is under discussion, which is regarded by the Chilean actuaries as very light. It is, of course, intended to allow for future mortality improvement, and for antiselection, but certainly appears to lead to very strong reserves. The SVS is concerned to ensure a high level of security for the annuities, given the compulsory nature of the system, although it is not clear how concentration on stringent reserving requirements for annuity business excludes the possibility of problems arising in an insurance company from other types of business.
8.1.10
Some have suggested that contribution compliance is still poor (poor compliance was endemic under the former system), but the problem is the nature of participation in the labour market, with many affiliates having only a very partial contribution record. With 5 million people in the economically active population, more than 5 million accounts have been activated but only 3 million people are currently contributing. Of the balance, some 250,000 are in exempt categories, such as the armed forces, and 250,000 are still contributing to the old pay-as-yougo defined benefit scheme. The remaining 1.5 million are self-employed or working in the informal economy; only 50,000 of these have opted to contribute to the AFP system.
8.1.11
The level of transaction costs is quite high: many feel that is exacerbated by the right to change AFPs once a year. With the high investment returns which have been experienced, amounts accumulated at retirement should generally be satisfactory. In these circumstances the guaranteed minimum level of pension should not involve much cost for the government. There is potentially a significant contingent liability in this respect. The cost of transition to the new system has had quite major budgetary implications, with the cost of continuing to pay pensioners from the old system, and to finance recognition bonds when affiliates of the new system reach retirement age, adding up to 5% or so of GDP each year over a fairly lengthy transition period. This was manageable for the Chilean economy, which was running a budget surplus over much of the period, and, crucially, at the start of the transition.
Argentina 8.2.1
In recent years the Chilean concept of funded individual account pensions has been taken up, with various modifications, in other countries of south and central America. Argentina introduced individual accounts in 1994, but, unlike Chile, left a basic social security pension in place, which currently requires contributions from employers at around 10% of salaries (up to about US$59,000 a year). A further 11% of salaries is payable by the employees into the AFJP (Administrador de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones -the Argentinean equivalent of a Chilean AFP) of the contributor's choice. In Argentina individuals can, if they wish, opt to pay these additional contributions into the social security scheme to purchase additional benefits there instead of having a funded individual account.
8.2.2
With a reduced level of contributions to the social security scheme, some changes were necessary to maintain financial balance on a pay-as-you-go basis. The pension age is being gradually raised by 5 years, to 65 for men and 60 for women. The period of contribution necessary to qualify for a pension is also being doubled from 15 to 30 years. Existing rights in the social security system will be recognised by payment of defined benefit pensions as and when individuals reach retirement age.
8.2.3
There are about 17 AFJPs, with over two-thirds of the economically active population affiliated, but 6 of the AFJPs have 80% of the business. As in Chile the AFJPs must guarantee a real rate of return which does not diverge by more than 2 percentage points from the average return of all AFJPs in the year (with an additional requirement that it must be at least 70% of the average return). In addition to the continuing arrangements for a basic social security pension, the government also guarantees an underpin for the defined contribution element.
Mexico
8.3.1
Under the new Mexican mandatory individual account social security system, which began on 1 July 1997, new entrants to the labour market are required to contribute to the funded system. Existing members of the labour force have certain retained rights with regard to the former defined benefit social security system. Part of the social security contributions of employers and employees is paid into the AFORE (Administrador de Fondos de Retiro -the private pension fund administrator, similar to AFP in Chile and AFJP in Argentina) of the individual's choice. The contributions allocated to the AFOREs are 6.5% of covered earnings up to 15 times the minimum wage and 2% above that level, up to 25 times the minimum wage. The 15 times cap is to be increased by 1 minimum wage each year, reaching 25 times the minimum wage in 2007.
8.3.2
Disability and survivors' benefits are paid for by a contribution of a further 2.5%. of covered earnings. In addition 1.5% is contributed to retiree medical care, making a total contribution of 10.5% for these benefits, which is the same total as under the previous system for old age, disability and survivors' pensions, if one includes the 2% contributions to savings for retirement. The government also contributes 5.5% of the minimum wage per employee to fund the deficit in the payas-you-go system.
8.3.3
At retirement the accumulated sum will be available for the purchase of an indexlinked annuity (with reversion to spouse and orphans) from an insurance company. The individual will be able to elect for programmed withdrawals instead of an annuity. Those with retained rights in the old system (IMSS) will be able to elect to receive their IMSS entitlement pension instead. In such cases the accumulated sum will be handed over to IMSS in return for payment of the relevant pension (which they in turn will purchase from an insurance company).
8.3.4
Existing pensions in payment will continue to be the responsibility of IMSS and will be paid for out of the general government budget. Normal retirement age will continue to be 65, although benefits may be taken from age 60 if out of work.
8.3.5
The contributions for disability and survivorship benefits are not passed over to the AFOREs. Although responsibility remains with the IMSS for these benefits (on death before retirement age), IMSS no longer pays the benefits directly, but, for benefits vesting on or after 1 July 1997, purchases an annuity from the insurance company of the claimant's choice.
8.3.6
No guarantees are provided on the investment of the AFOREs, as it was felt that the guarantees required under other such individual account systems (e.g. in Chile and Argentina) would unduly constrain investment freedom. However, the government will guarantee a minimum level of pension to every retiree (at the level of the minimum wage).
8.3.7
Contributions continue to be collected by IMSS and are passed on to the chosen AFORE in bulk. AFOREs are licensed by a regulatory body under the Ministry of Finance. Only insurance companies are allowed to offer annuities; they are supervised by the Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas, also under the Ministry of Finance. The liability for payment of pensions rests with IMSS in case of failure of an AFORE or insurance company, so that the privatisation can be regarded as a form of reinsurance. There is a strong element of mutualisation of disability and mortality risk through the payment by all of a fixed percentage of earnings for risk benefits. IMSS will continue to manage this risk sharing, reinsuring the delivery of the resulting annuities, with the insurance companies taking on the subsequent mortality and financial risks.
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
9.1 Some interesting developments in the field of complementary pension schemes are taking place in central and eastern Europe. Each of the countries in the region has a fully developed social security scheme, originally providing a good level of benefits relative to salary levels, although the benefits have in many cases now been significantly eroded by inflation. The costs were met either from the national budget or from the contributions of employers. There were generally no employee contributions and there was little or no scope for private pension arrangements.
9.2
Following the political changes in these countries and in the light of concerns about the growing costs of the social security schemes, each country is embarking on a programme of reform of the social security scheme, in conjunction, in most cases, with plans to encourage the formation of complementary pension schemes. Reform packages usually involve: the introduction of employee contributions, the elimination of special categories of members with privileged benefits, raising retirement age (especially, initially, for women, who generally have a very low retirement age, particularly if they have had children), introduction of unemployment benefits, and scaling down of pension benefits.
Hungary 9.3.1 Hungary introduced legislation in 1993 to provide for the establishment of mutual benefit funds, reviving an old tradition in the country, but now primarily as vehicles for complementary pension provision (health insurance and welfare funds are also provided for). The funds can be set up on the initiative of an employer or group of employers, or at the instigation of a group of employees (with or without financial support from their employers) or by a group of people with some common affiliation (e.g. members of a union or profession, or people from a particular geographical area). Control is exercised by the members but the fund is required to make use of appropriate professional skills, including actuarial skills if any death benefits or annuities are provided.
9.3.2
Further legislation was passed in July 1997 to introduce mandatory private pension funds. Employees will be required to pay contributions of 6% of earnings in 1998, 7% in 1999 and 8% from 2000 onwards. Additional voluntary contributions are permitted up to 10% of earnings. Private pension funds to provide the mandatory coverage may be established by employers, professional associations, mutual benefit funds or local governments. Membership of the new funded system is mandatory for new entrants to the labour market after 1 July 1998, and optional for employees aged 47 or less. Older employers, pensioners, and younger employees who so opt, will remain in the old pay-as-you-go social security system, which will be mainly financed by employer contributions (currently 24% of earnings but expected to be 22% from 200 onwards), by contributions from employees who remain in that system (7% of earnings rising to 9% from 2000 onwards), and by 1% contributions from employees who participate in the new private funds.
Czech Republic
9.4
The Czech legislation provides for the establishment of commercially run pension "open" funds, owned by insurance companies, investment houses, or other interested providers of capital. Individuals can select which pension fund to belong to, or employers may offer to their employees membership in a particular fund, with a defined level of employer and employee contributions. There are no tax reliefs for these funds, but a small matching contribution is available from the government if employees opt to contribute. Russia 9.5.1
9.5.2
A considerable number of pension funds have already been established in Russia, where there has been prolonged discussion about the legislation, which was eventually approved by the Duma in April 1998. Defined contribution or defined benefit schemes are to be permitted, although the former are expected to predominate. There will be single employer funds (primarily for large employers), as well as open funds which individuals or small employers can join. Funds are required to invest through a separate asset management company. A number of issues which have been uncertain have been clarified by the passing of this legislation and there is some optimism that there will now be strong development of the pension fund sector.
The Superintendent of Pension Funds has been established and is authorising pension funds which meet certain criteria. Examinations have been held with a view to licensing pension actuaries to work with pension funds. They are expected to have a grasp of the fundamentals of actuarial mathematics, knowledge of the principles of investment, familiarity with the provisions of the non-State pension fund law and the requirements of the Superintendent, as well as general knowledge about the ways in which pension funds can be operated.
Slovak Republic 9.6 9.7
Legislation was passed in the Slovak Republic in 1996 to permit the formation of pension funds. They may be employer-specific, multi-employer (e.g. industrywide) or open funds to which anyone can affiliate.
Poland
A system of mandatory private pension funds is to be introduced in Poland from the beginning of 1999. The social security system will remain as the first pillar, restructured along similar lines to the new Swedish scheme as a notional defined contribution structure. Contributions to the new funded system will be mandatory for those under the age of 30 at the start and optional for those over that age and under the age of 50. Contributions will only be mandatory on earnings up to 2½ times national average income. The pension funds will just handle the accumulation and investment of monies up to retirement age, when an annuity will be required to be purchased from a specialised pension annuity company. The government will underwrite a minimum level of pension (from the first and second pillar systems together) of 28% of national average earnings.
Latvia 9.8.1 Latvia has also been engaged in a major pensions reform. In 1995 the Saeima (parliament) approved the concept for pension reform, involving the introduction of funded complementary pension funds. An Act of Parliament making changes to the social security retirement pension was passed in November 1995 and the new provisions came into effect in January 1996. Pension age for women is being increased from 55 to 60, the same as for men. The pension calculation has changed to something akin to a defined contribution basis, with accumulation of contributions on a basis related to economic growth and conversion of the resulting amount to a pension by means of an annuity factor. This approach follows the recent proposals for a revised social security scheme in Sweden.
9.8.2 Funded private pensions are being developed, both to relieve pressure on the social security system and to develop the capital markets through institutional investment.
To begin with the system will be voluntary. This will enable appropriate regulatory procedures to be put in place and valuable experience to be gained in the running of non-State pension funds. Once the system is fully operational, it is intended to make it compulsory for all in the labour market to contribute.
Croatia 9.9 A three pillar system is expected to be introduced in Croatia from 1999 with the first pillar slimmed down to produce a maximum basic pension of 32% of national average earnings from a retirement age of 65 for both men and women (as compared to 60 for men and 55 for women currently). A new funded second pillar, based on individual accounts, will be introduced for those aged 40 and below at the start, with existing accrued entitlements being recognised, but accrual only of the new basic pension thereafter, together with the funded complementary arrangement.
The deficit which will arise from switching some of the contributions to the second pillar system will be covered from the State budget.
Kazakhstan
9.10
A new system of defined contribution funded complementary pensions was introduced from 1 January 1998. Those entering the workforce after that date will receive retirement benefits based solely on the funded system, whereas existing members of the workforce will receive partial pensions from the first pillar system. Only employers are required to pay contributions, with 15% of payroll going to finance the pay-as-you-go system and 10% to individual accounts. Employees will be able to make additional voluntary contributions, with some tax deferral benefits. There will be a statutory minimum level of pensions for those in respect of whom mandatory pension contributions have been made for three-quarters of the time between January 1998 and retirement.
MODELLING PENSION REFORM
10.1 Whilst there are many economic and political arguments about pension reform, one of the major contributions which actuaries can make is in modelling the financial impact of proposals. The impact of major changes to a pension system is complex and the focus of attention may be on one or more of the following aspects:
benefit costs of social security scheme employer and employee contributions necessary to meet costs of social security overall financing impact on employers and employees adequacy of resulting pensions for different subsections of the population cost of tax reliefs and effect on tax revenue overall impact on public expenditure (however defined) impact on capital markets impact on economy as a whole size and structure of private funded schemes 10.2 Detailed consideration of the range of topics listed above is not possible within the scope of a short paper. However, we present some results from a simplified model to illustrate the timing and order of magnitude of some key design features and assumptions.
10.3 Table 3 summarises the projected numbers in the population of a hypothetical country from 1990 to 2040, on two alternative scenarios as to future fertility developments. The low fertility scenario assumes that period fertility continues to fall for a few more years, levelling out at a total period fertility rate of 1.5 from 2010. The medium fertility scenario assumes a modest increase in fertility from current levels, to the levels of the late 1980s, with total period fertility rate of 1.8 from 2010. Allowance is made in both projections for steady mortality improvement. Migration has been assumed to be zero.
10.4
The demographic ageing process can readily be seen, with steadily growing numbers over pension age, whether this is set at 60, 65 or 70. The population of working age (broadly taken as represented by the 20-59 age group) rises to 2010 and then falls back, roughly to current levels by 2040 on the medium fertility scenario but to somewhat lower than current levels on the low fertility scenario. The old-age dependency ratio, defined here as the ratio of the population over 60 to that between 20 and 60, rises from 0.29 in 1990 to 0.70 in 2040 on the low fertility scenario, and to 0.65 in 2040 on the medium fertility scenario. Even a relatively high fertility scenario, with total period fertility rates rising to 2.1 or higher, would still result in almost a doubling of this dependency ratio measure over the 50 year period, reflecting the fact that much of the potential for ageing is already built into the current population structure and the current low fertility rates, combined with the assumption of improving mortality. An assumption of more rapidly improving mortality would further worsen the age balance, as it has greatest impact on the projected elderly population.
10.5
We consider first a simple pay-as-you-go pension system which provides a pension of 50% of national average earnings from the retirement age of 60 to those who meet the qualifying conditions. To simulate a scheme which is still not mature, we assume that 90% of males aged 60-69 in 1990 are in receipt of this pension, and 90% of all those reaching 60 thereafter, but proportions lower than 90% for agegroups over 70 (85% for 70-74, 80% for 75-79, etc) and lower proportions for females. Assumptions are made about activity rates for each age-group of the working population and approximate allowance is made for earnings to change with age. None of these assumptions are particularly critical with regard to the patterns of outcomes which we illustrate. They do, of course, affect the absolute level of contributions required to finance a particular benefit level.
10.6 Table 4 shows the projected pay-as-you-go contribution levels to finance this particular benefit structure on the alternative fertility scenarios. We consider retirement age 60, but also look at the effect of a higher retirement age of 65 and a retirement age rising from 60 to 65 between 2000 and 2020. This illustrates the very substantial increase which is projected for the PAYG contribution if nothing is done, particularly in the low fertility scenario. Raising retirement age from 60 to 65 helps to moderate the increase, particularly over the period to 2010, but significant increases are still projected for later years, rising to almost double the 1990 levels by 2040.
10.7 A well-known feature of PAYG systems is that the working population are paying, not for their own pensions, but for those of previous generations of workers who are now retired. A consequence of this is that there is enormous "momentum" in the system. Even if accrual of entitlement to pension benefit were stopped completely for the future, the PAYG cost of meeting the accrued liabilities would be substantial for many years. Table 5 illustrates this.
10.8
Clearly the Table 5 scenario would be difficult to sustain as a pension policy, even though the resulting contribution rates might be attractive. By 2025 those retiring would be entitled only to a pension of 25% of national average earnings and by 2050 those retiring would have no entitlement. Such a radical step might, however, be accompanied by the introduction of mandatory contributions to a funded defined contribution system. Table 6 shows the percentage reduction in retirement benefits for each generation reaching retirement age after 2000 (taken as  65 for this table) , with an assumed mandatory contribution of 10% of earnings, according to the real rate of return on the funded part of the provision. Although in most cases the indexation (if any) required on the pension deriving from the funded part will be based on the consumer price index, Table 6 also shows the loss of pension with earnings indexation, which is really a fairer comparison with the earnings-linked social security benefit which is being replaced. Generations reaching retirement age in the years immediately after 2000 will have relatively little opportunity to build up a sizeable fund. Those in the final column will, however, have contributed to the funded system for almost all of their career. By this point, the funded pension with a 10% contribution level can replace the lost social security pension if the real rate of return net of earnings is 2% a year (net of expenses) or more.
10.9
It should be noted that the defined contribution scheme is assumed to require the purchase of an index-linked annuity (linked to prices or earnings) and this has been included on the basis, respectively, of 3% or 1½% real return after retirement, assuming investment in index-linked bonds, regardless of the assumption for investment growth (assumed to be a mixed portfolio) prior to retirement. The comparison in the first half of Table 6 is not entirely transparent, as the first pillar pension which is being given up is assumed to go up in line with earnings, whereas the complementary pensions go up only in line with prices after award. It should be noted that the funded system will result in the accumulation of very large funds; even at 1% real return up to retirement these could amount to 5 times the total salary mass after 40 years of the new system (by 2040) with 10% contributions. At 3% real rate of return up to retirement with 12% contributions, the funds could amount to more than 8 times salary mass.
10.10
The other side to the story is the contribution rate. A mandatory contribution rate of 10% to the funded system from the year 2000 produces aggregate contributions which give substantial increases relative to the old PAYG system for some years, as shown in Table 7 . Although lower contributions are achieved by 2040, the increases of contributions in the early years of the transition would be difficult to accommodate, so some phasing would be required, for example 2% in the first 5 years, 4% in the second 5 years and so on. Even this leaves quite a high transitional cost, for example from 2010 to 2025. It would also substantially increase the pension losses for some generations whose life-time contributions would on average be well below 10%. This aspect could be alleviated by introducing a scale of contributions to the new funded system when it starts, with those close to retirement paying closer to 10% (or having higher contributions paid by employers on their behalf). A disadvantage of such an approach is that it is likely to be a disincentive to the employment of older workers. Alternatively the whole transition can be phased over a much longer period, for example by leaving those over a selected cut-off age (e.g. 40 or 45) in the old PAYG system.
10.11
Since many new individual account systems have been established on the basis of contributions of 10% of earnings being allocated to the savings account (net of deductions), it is worth considering the conditions under which this is likely to produce adequate pensions. Table 8 shows the replacement ratios (initial pension as a percentage of final year's earnings) for a variety of real rates of return (net of earnings growth and fund charges) and for different starting ages. Not surprisingly, replacement ratios are relatively low unless contributions are made for a full 40 year career (no allowance is made for any interruption of earnings). Even for someone entering at 25 and contributing up to retirement age of 65, a replacement rate of two thirds of final earnings can only be achieved with an average real rate of return net of earnings growth of 3% a year or more. This suggests that a 10% contribution is unlikely to be sufficient to give most people an adequate pension, unless investment conditions are particularly good or there is a sizeable first pillar pension. A more realistic target level of contributions might be 15% of earnings if there is only a modest first pillar.
LESSONS FROM THE PENSION REFORM PROCESS
11.1
The last few years have seen a spate of pension reform programmes throughout South and Central America and Central and Eastern Europe. A common feature is that almost all involve the concept of fully funded defined contribution individual accounts, drawing on the Chilean experience, although with a variety of individual characteristics. Management of investment funds is decentralised, with private managers. The fund management bodies are usually profit-making entities (except for the voluntary mutual benefit funds in Hungary) but are subject to more or less intensive regulation and scrutiny by a supervisory body. Supervision may be by a part of a government department (such as the Ministry of Finance) or by a semiindependent agency, reporting to a minister, usually the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Welfare.
11.2 Some countries have made it compulsory to contribute to a funded individual account; others have started with a voluntary system, perhaps with the intention of making it compulsory later. In some countries the new funded system applies on a mandatory basis to new entrants to the labour market, but on a voluntary basis, or not at all, to existing members of the workforce. There is usually freedom to switch from one pension provider to another, although there may be restrictions on how frequently this is permitted. The investment policy of the funds is usually significantly constrained by regulations, overseen by the supervisory authority.
11.3
Many countries wish to maintain a public pay-as-you-go social security system as the first pillar, albeit perhaps with significant changes to restrain the growth of costs. In a number of cases the government is underwriting various guarantees with regard to the funded system, for example a minimum level of pension after a given number of years of contribution, or a minimum rate of return. The pension funds, or the companies responsible for administering them, may be required to offer other guarantees, for example in relation to the return on the funds, or may do so for competitive reasons.
11.4
There are different approaches to charging structures, including deductions from the initial contributions, part of the return on the funds, or an exit charge on withdrawal of monies from the fund. Some régimes restrict the use which can be made of certain types of charges, or the level at which they can be pitched.
11.5
Some systems permit withdrawals to be made before retirement age, although most are designed to produce a capital sum at retirement age. Options which may be available include -----taking all or part as a lump sum converting the accumulated amount (or part of it) into a life annuity (with or without a reversionary annuity to a partner) withdrawing income on a more or less regular basis until the fund is extinguished withdrawing income for a period and then purchasing an annuity converting the accumulated amount into an annuity certain 11.6 A few countries have sought to encourage a strong level of employer involvement, in the expectation that many pension funds will be established by individual employers for their employees, or perhaps by groups of employers in a particular industry. Other possibilities include different types of affinity groups, for example based on locality, profession, union membership, religious affiliation. Almost all systems allow for the possibility of entirely open funds, to which anyone may contribute.
11.7
Most of these pension reforms are still at a relatively early stage. Only the Chilean system has a significant track record, and special factors which were present in the Chilean experience make it difficult to draw conclusions of general application. Early indications are that these individual account systems are proving popular, with significant numbers opting for that route where a choice is offered. There have, however, been some upsets, with a number of failures arising from, for example, investment in the sponsoring company or inability to attract sufficient affiliates to cover expenses.
11.8
A danger which may become more evident over time is the increased exposure of the insurance market to the risk of longevity. In some countries the annuities arising from the new funded pension system will rapidly become a very major part of the new business of the insurance industry. In Chile the total considerations for annuity purchase are already higher than the aggregate of other premium income for life insurance companies. This could happen quite quickly in Mexico also.
With annuities required to be written on a non-participating price-indexed basis, this exposes life insurance companies quite strongly to any mis-matching risk, if index-linked assets of sufficiently long duration (or an adequate spread of durations) are not available, and to a longevity risk if mortality improves more rapidly than allowed for in premium rates or there is a significant antiselection problem (with programmed withdrawal options available as an alternative to annuity purchase).
11.9
Some lessons which might be drawn include:
the importance of having in place from the start a clear regulatory framework and a strong supervisory authority; the need to adapt the concepts to the circumstances of the country, including its existing social security system, legal framework, social and political ethos and state of development towards a market economy; the desirability in most cases of retaining the public social security system as a safety net; the need to have a properly functioning banking system and at least embryonic capital markets; the desirability of the government making available suitably long-dated bonds, including index-linked bonds, for pension funds to invest in; the desirability of facilitating the formation of employer-sponsored schemes (occupational schemes) as well as open funds:
the need to plan the transition very carefully, with both short and long term financial projections, in order to maintain financial balance in the public social security system and keep public expenditure under control; ----the need to avoid imposing too many constraints on the freedom of pension funds to charge to cover their costs, whilst preventing the potential abuses of high charges; the need to ensure that options and guarantees are not offered which cannot realistically be given, or whose true costs have not been properly assessed; the need to control the marketing of personal pensions the need to plan well in advance for the creation of an annuity market with appropriate deployment of actuarial expertise in pricing, reserving and asset/liability management.
11.10
The importance of the actuarial role appears to have received insufficient attention in some cases. Naturally enough, countries without an established actuarial profession are less familiar with the role which actuaries should play, and it is sometimes assumed that a defined contribution system can be run without much actuarial involvement, whereas it is rightly recognised that a defined benefit system would be impossible without actuaries. Nevertheless, it seems clear that a properly functioning defined contribution system will also require many of the skills of actuaries, and a priority in the pension reform process should be to establish a process for training and qualifying actuaries to work in this field, preferably as a specialism within the framework of a more general actuarial education process. To the extent that actuarial expertise is limited, care needs to be taken to restrict the operation of the pension funds accordingly. One option, for example, would be to require pension funds to purchase life (and survivorship) annuities from life insurance companies, where actuarial expertise certainly will be required. Options and guarantees would also need to be carefully avoided.
11.11
The principal activities for which an actuary is needed in relation to defined contribution pension arrangements are:
-ensuring appropriate design of pension fund contracts, including arrangements for covering expenses of administration and investment management and the appropriateness and affordability of any guarantees offered -pricing of guarantees and any options offered to members -control of expenses and management of necessary changes to the expense charges which are applied to contributions, to funds or to withdrawals -ensuring that adequate technical provisions are maintained for future expense commitments and for the cost of any guarantees and options -determining appropriate rates of conversion of accumulated sums at retirement into annuities -ensuring that adequate technical provisions are maintained, with appropriate investments to back them, in respect of any liabilities to pay annuities, either for life, for term certain, or to surviving dependants -advising on appropriate investment policy -advising on the appropriate general level of contributions to achieve target levels of pension -advising on additional contributions which a member might make, to top up their pension to target a desired level -advising on arrangements to finance any risk benefits, such as additional cover on death or disability, including the possibility of reinsurance 11.12 In many countries a radical reform process is probably unavoidable, because of the collapse of the previous social security system or manifest shortcomings. The new system has to have good incentives to contribute, and should, if possible, contribute to economic development. However, a combination of modest social security and mandatory defined contribution individual accounts will not necessarily lead to everyone having adequate income in retirement, especially if investment returns struggle to keep pace with inflation. At the level at which contributions are likely to be set in most mandatory systems, additional voluntary provision will still need to be strongly encouraged.
11.13
There remains a lively debate on what sort of pension reform is best for industrialised countries, with long-established (and reasonably efficient) social security schemes. A full Latin American style reform is unlikely to be considered appropriate in most continental European countries, since there is a strong social and cultural attachment to social security in its traditional form and a belief in the value of social protection and concepts of solidarity. Question about whether individual cohorts are "getting their money's worth", such as are commonly asked in North America, are barely understood. However, demographic and other pressures on the financing of such schemes in an era of intensive international competition and with the need to comply with stringent criteria on public indebtedness, will mean that significant reforms will be needed in countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and Spain, to name but a few.
11.14 One can expect to see reductions in the level of social security benefits and much greater emphasis on the role of funded complementary schemes. It is quite likely that the strength of the European social tradition will ensure that occupational pension arrangements have a significant role to play in many countries. However, personal pensions will undoubtedly also become more popular. Many countries will need to consider whether to make the funded second pillar mandatory, in order to ensure that there are not major gaps in coverage (including the selfemployed).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
12.1
The topic of social security and pension reform is a vast one, with so many variations in the form and mode of delivery of pension benefits, so it would be rash to draw too many firm general conclusions. It is also unreasonable to expect there to be any panacea for the significant problems facing social security pension schemes. Each country has its own characteristics, even if the ageing of the population is a widespread phenomenon. A viable pension reform must have regard to the detailed structure of the existing social security and pension arrangements, to the historical background, to the current social structure and to factors such as the state of development of the banking sector and the capital markets.
12.2 Payment of pensions to the elderly involves a transfer of resources from those parts of the economy where wealth is being created. This is so whether it is done through transfer payments (by means of tax or a public social security system), or through a funded system involving the private sector. The mechanisms are, of course, different, and the impact of ageing may be less evident in a funded system. In principle, however, the changing demographics will affect the relative interests of workers and shareholders, and the value of investments will be affected by the balance of buyers and sellers, which could change markedly as the population ages and pension funds become "super-mature".
12.3
It is not at all clear that increasing the level of funded pension provision will necessarily increase overall savings levels in the economy, or generate new productive investment. This form of saving may simply replace other forms, and the additional investment may drive up prices if there are insufficient worthwhile investment projects to absorb the extra funds. Nevertheless, it is widely assumed that the growth of funded pension arrangements will be beneficial for the economy. It could certainly play a role in facilitating the development of an active capital market in countries which are at an early stage of development as market economies. Switching to a funded system (or increasing the degree of reliance on funding) may also help to focus on affordability of pension promises and may encourage individuals to identify with their accruing pension rights and take a more active interest in pensions.
12.4
The rising cost of paying pensions to the elderly will be made more affordable if the economy exhibits sustainable real growth, inflation is kept under control and unemployment is brought down to a low level. The capital investment resulting from funding may play a contributory role in bringing about these favourable outcomes.
12.5 It is likely that most countries will seek to develop a multi-pillar pension system, with social security as the first pillar, a funded second pillar based on the employment relationship and a third pillar based on individual initiative. However, there will be a lot of resistance in many countries to reducing the first pillar to a flat-rate or means-tested safety net, as recommended by the World Bank, so many first pillars will still offer substantial salary-related benefits, at least for lower earners. Reforms will, however, include raising retirement age, making indexation less expensive, toughening eligibility conditions, reducing the earnings ceiling for benefit, reducing benefit accrual rates but probably still requiring some increase in contributions of employees and employers.
12.6 For the second pillar there is likely to be a lively debate on whether or not contributing to a funded system should be made compulsory. If it is not, there may need to be a higher first pillar, with contracting-out options, if an underclass with inadequate pension provision is to be avoided. Concerns about the security of private funded pensions will need to be addressed by strong systems of regulation and supervision. If the second pillar is voluntary, strong encouragement should be given to employers to set up externally funded occupational pension schemes, as this will be a more effective way of increasing coverage. Employer-sponsored pension funds are often more efficient, even as part of a compulsory system, and help to keep down the transaction costs and administrative overheads. It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of moving across the scale from solidarity systems to individual accounts that a greater and greater degree of regulation is thought to be necessary.
12.7
To the extent that open funds are used, particular attention needs to be given to keeping the marketing costs down, and avoiding frequent switching possibilities.
The marketing of such schemes provides fertile opportunities for misleading unsophisticated customers and needs to be strictly controlled. Requiring schemes to offer investment performance guarantees, or limits on expense charges, may be attractive from a public interest point of view. However, careful attention should then be paid to reserving requirements and pension fund providers should satisfy prudent free asset requirements. The more guarantees are introduced, the more important it is to have proper actuarial financial control.
12.8 Although pension reform programmes will often be presented as reducing the involvement of government, disengagement may be difficult to achieve. Apart from the important role of regulation and supervision, taxation policy is a key factor. Governments also remain responsible for fall-back guarantees of minimum income (through means-tested welfare benefits, even if there is no explicit guarantee of pension level). In some cases governments may retain a role as guarantor of last resort for compensation funds, and almost all systems assume that governments will issue sufficient bonds (particularly index-linked bonds) to enable annuity liabilities to be satisfactorily matched.
12.9
The growth of funded pension systems will provide significant opportunities for actuaries to play a major role. However, it is likely in the short term that the growth will be very largely in defined contribution schemes and the need for actuarial involvement in this type of scheme for sound financial management is not always well understood. In many of the countries where pension reform is taking place, the establishment or strengthening of the actuarial profession must be a priority.
12.10
Whatever the process of social security debate and ultimate reform in individual countries, it is important for the actuarial profession to get across the message that actuaries can play an important role in the development of policy and its implementation. Source: Roseveare et al (1996) Notes:
1. Net present value of employee and employer contributions less pensions paid until 2070, plus existing assets.
2.
Productivity growth is assumed to be 1.5% a year.
3.
All economies are assumed to have returned to their medium term growth path and there is no cyclical unemployment.
4.
Participation rates are assumed to remain constant.
5.
As far as possible all legislated reforms to date have been taken into account.
6.
The scenarios for the Netherlands do not take account of recent changes to the widows' and orphans' scheme, which are estimated to reduce expenditure by 4 per cent. Source: Chand and Jaeger (1996) Notes:
1. Contribution rates include net budget transfers.
2.
The sustainable contribution rate is defined as the constant contribution rate over 1995-2050 that equalizes the net asset position in 2050 with the initial asset position in 1995.
3.
The contribution gap is defined as the difference between the sustainable contribution rate and the projected contribution rate in 1995. 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.52 0.55 0.65 Table 6 Percentage reduction in retirement pension by cohort if accrual of PAYG scheme ceases after 1999 and mandatory contributions of 10% are required thereafter to a funded system (TPFR 1.5, Retirement age 65; different real rates of return net of earnings during the accumulation period) Year of birth 1935 Year of birth -40 1940 Year of birth -45 1945 Year of birth -50 1950 Year of birth -55 1955 Year of birth -60 1960 Year of birth -65 1965 Year of birth -70 1970 Annuity indexed to prices 
